Law, Economics and the Institutional Approach to Development and Transition: towards an Evolutionary Perspective


  • Enrico Colombatto Professor of Economics at the University of Turin, Director of ICER and Fellow at the «Collegio Carlo Alberto Foundation».



The principles underlying evolutionary psychology suggest an approach to Law and Economics that tends to reject top-down policy making and encourages a bottom-up stance, whereby rules lead to behavioral routines that are consistent with individuals’ shared psychological patterns. The view proposed here is fruitful from a methodological perspective, in that it allows a new classification of societies, new insight on their prospects for economic growth, an innovative appreciation of the chances for successful transition in areas that have undergone substantial political transformation.

Key words: Institutions, behavioral patterns, law and economics.

Clasificación JEL: K00, B52.

Resumen: Los principios que subyacen a la psicología evolutiva, sugieren una aproximación al Derecho y a la Economía que tiende a rechazar una gestión política de arriba a abajo, y estimula una estrategia de abajo hacia arriba, por medio de la cual las reglas conducen a rutinas de comportamiento que son consistentes con los patrones psicológicos compartidos de los individuos. El enfoque propuesto en este trabajo es fructífero desde una perspectiva metodológica, en el sentido de que permite una nueva cla-sificación de las sociedades, una nueva visión de sus perspectivas de creci-miento económico, una apreciación innovadora de las oportunidades de transición exitosas en áreas que han experimentado una transformación política sustancial.

Palabras clave: Instituciones, patrones de comportamiento, Derecho y Eco-nomía.


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How to Cite

Colombatto, E. . (2006). Law, Economics and the Institutional Approach to Development and Transition: towards an Evolutionary Perspective. REVISTA PROCESOS DE MERCADO, 3(1), 11–45.