A Rejoinder to Crovelli’s “The Courtiers of Confusion”






This paper is a response to Crovelli’s rejoinder to our original critique of his objection to Ludwig von Mises’ supposedly misguided adoption of frequentism. First, we demonstrate the unimportance of Crovelli’s favoured distinction between the probability and method for generating probabilities. Further on, we show that on some reading of “subjectivism” his claim that determinism necessitates embracing the subjective definition of probability is simply trivial. After clearing up these misconceptions, we state what we believe are two real points of disagreements between us and Crovelli. Specifically, we argue — contra Crovelli — that (1) determinism does not require construing probabilities as degrees of beliefs and that (2) frequentism is compatible with both the deterministic and the indeterministic worldview. Finally, we enumerate some additional challenges Crovelli left unaddressed and which, we believe, his theory would be powerless to address in any case.


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2023-02-20 — Updated on 2023-02-21


How to Cite

WYSOCKI, I., & E. BLOCK, W. (2023). A Rejoinder to Crovelli’s “The Courtiers of Confusion”. REVISTA PROCESOS DE MERCADO, 19(2). https://doi.org/10.52195/pm.v19i2.822 (Original work published February 20, 2023)